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Patrick O. Gudridge* 
I begin with Herman Melville and Thomas Bernhard. 
Legal writing is often and rightly enough an ant-like exercise, an effort to 
take up the work of others and extend or alter it, in the process passing the 
project on to the next in line.  It is therefore important, I think, to seize outsize 
treatment of law wherever we find it, to try to appreciate whatever the particular 
effort shows us about the structure and possibilities of our ordinary work that 
might not be so visible in familiar, close at hand forms.  To this end, I look closely 
at two Melville stories -- The Paradise of Bachelors and The Tartarus of Maids is 
perhaps not widely read, but Bartleby, the Scrivener is of course famous.  I also 
extract passages from Bernhard’s novel Correction.  Both writers are preoccupied 
by paper, by its ubiquity and proliferation and legal concomitants, significant 
notwithstanding utter ordinariness.  A largely excluded possibility within 
contemporary jurisprudence emerges, I want to suggest.  Roughly the last half of 
this essay elaborates on this opportunity, propagating terms like “documentary 
substrate,” “paper tectonics,” and “legal seismics.”  Readers run risks, therefore.    
I. Melville, Paper, Law 
There is nothing new, of course, in the suggestion that works of Herman 
Melville might offer readers provocative ideas or images of law. Sometimes, we 
know, legal process is an immediately evident and obviously integral part of the 
story (in Billy Budd, for example.)1  In any case, we ought not to be surprised if 
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In other work, I initially sketched somewhat different versions of parts of the approach that I develop in the 
latter sections of this essay. See Patrick O. Gudridge, Title VII Arbitration, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
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1
 The necessary reference is, of course, Richard Weisberg, How Judges Speak: Some Lessons on 
Adjudication in Billy Budd, Sailor with an Application to Justice Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1982).  
For judicial perspective, in a careful and extended recent essay, see Juan Ramirez, Jr. & Amy D. Ronner, 
Voiceless Billy Budd: Melville’s Tribute to the Sixth Amendment, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 103 (2004).  
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Melville sometimes wrote about legal matters given his father-in-law, the famous 
Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw.2  I am not interested here, however, in 
straightforward, foreground presences.  Rather, I look at law in the background, 
call attention to a maybe distinctively Melvillean stress, evident even if treated as 
given in Tartarus and Bartleby.3 
A. 
Herman Melville’s story The Paradise of Bachelors and The Tartarus of Maids, 
first published in 1855,4 brings together two accounts -- about a dinner a narrator 
                                                
2
 See Brook Thomas, The Legal Fictions of Herman Melville and Lemuel Shaw, 11 CRITICAL INQUIRY 24 
(1984). 
3
 Brook Thomas discusses Bartleby at length in his magisterial essay and briefly juxtaposes it with 
Tartarus.  See Thomas, supra note 2, at 34-39.  Professor Thomas, working out the implications of his 
juxtaposition of Melville and Chief Justice Shaw, is more interested in how Melville’s preoccupations 
overlap the substance of American judge-made common law as Shaw (and others) were working it out at 
the time.  In this respect, Thomas’s essay foreshadows his later important book: BROOK THOMAS, 
AMERICAN LITERARY REALISM AND THE FAILED PROMISE OF CONTRACT (1997).  For other recent, 
interesting discussions of Bartleby from legal academic perspectives, see, e.g., George Dargo, Bartleby, the 
Scrivener: “A House Like Me,” 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 819 (2010); Alfred S. Konefsky, The Accidental 
Legal Historian: Herman Melville and the History of American Law, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1179, 1219-45 
(2004) (also briefly discusses Tartarus). 
4
 I will cite to a readily available recent republication.  See Herman Melville, The Paradise of Bachelors and The 
Tartarus of Maids, 1 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE 2277 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter 
Tartarus].  The reading of this story that I develop here is, as far as I can tell, considerably different from other 
recent glosses that, for reasons that will become obvious even within my account, emphasize notions of gender, 
sexuality, class, and knowledge.  Thus, for example, Wai Chee Dimock treats this story in Residues of Justice as one 
illustration among many others of the tropes of disproportion and incompleteness, one confirmation of the ubiquity 
of the theme of “misfit justice” in nineteenth century American literature.  She calls attention to what readers today 
(at least) might regard, somewhat uncomfortably, as Melville’s altogether over the top depiction of the London 
diners -- all men, it turns out. Melville’s emphasis on their bachelor status and (what Dimock reads as) their 
effeminacy tends toward (what she thinks we would today regard as) homophobia.  See WAI CHEE DIMOCK, 
RESIDUES OF JUSTICE: LITERATURE, LAW, PHILOSOPHY  84 (1996).  The workers in the paper mill, in contrast, are all 
(except for supervisors) unmarried women, all wan servants of the machinery, all victims.  “Melville offers . . . a 
contrasting tableau of privilege and oppression, rendered in the idiom of class as well as the idiom of gender.”  Id.  
Dimock emphasizes Melville’s failure to recognize commonality, the possibility of commensurable lives.  Women 
workers of the time, we know, and Melville might have recognized too, were sometimes anyway not at all as he 
portrayed them.  Free of family bonds, empowered by the financial rewards of factory work, sustained by new 
friendships with co-workers: women workers (some of them, anyway) may well have considered themselves 
genuinely better off.  Id. at 87-88.  For extended consideration of the question, juxtaposing Tartarus with other, 
contemporary depictions, see DAVID S. REYNOLDS, BENEATH THE AMERICAN RENAISSANCE 351-57 (1988).   For 
other discussions, see, e.g., MICHAEL PAUL ROGIN, SUBVERSIVE GENEALOGY 201-08 (1979); Elizabeth Rodrigues, 
Melville’s The Paradise of Bachelors and The Tartarus of Maids, 66 THE EXPLICATOR 164 (2008); Sarah Wilson, 
Melville and the Architecture of Antebellum Masculinity, 76 AM. LITERATURE 59, 71-72 (2004); David Hurley 
Serlin, The Dialogue of Gender in Melville’s The Paradise of Bachelors and the Tartarus of Maids, 25 MODERN 
LANGUAGE STUD. (No. 2), p. 80 (1995); Karen A. Weyler, Melville’s “The Paradise of Bachelors and the Tartarus of 
Maids”: A Dialogue about Experience, Understanding, and Truth, 31 STUD. SHORT FICTION 461 (1994); Philip 
Young, The Machine in Tartarus: Melville’s Inferno, 63 AM. LITERATURE 208 (1991); Robyn Wiegman, Melville’s 
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attends in London, and a visit the same narrator makes to a paper mill 
somewhere in New England.  Melville sets up an explicit equation at the end of 
his account of the paper mill:  “Then, shooting through the pass, all alone with 
inscrutable nature, I exclaimed -- Oh!  Paradise of Bachelors!  and oh! Tartarus of 
Maids!”5  Perhaps this is “only an obligatory apostrophe.”6  The narrator, 
however, repeatedly refers to his London experience while visiting the mill.  We 
are, as readers, invited -- indeed, pressed -- to solve the puzzle of his 
juxtaposition.  The last sentence sets out two obvious points of departure.  It is 
the bachelors and the maids who are to be contrasted or equated. Or, read 
literally, it is the Paradise and the Tartarus -- the dining room and the factory.  
Taking this second tack supposes, before the process of comparison itself, some 
additional description.  It is easier, I think, to begin with the paper mill. 
The women workers are machine tenders.  “Machinery -- that vaunted 
slave of humanity -- here stood menially served by human beings, who served 
mutely and cringingly as the slave serves the Sultan.  The girls did not so much 
seem accessory wheels to the general machinery as mere cogs to the wheels.”7  
The machinery as such, at one level, is what is remarkable about the factory.  
“‘Yours is a most wonderful factory.  Your great machine is a miracle of 
inscrutable intricacy.”8  But Melville’s narrator more often finds the most striking 
aspect of the paper-making machines is their combination of biology and 
mechanism.  The paper itself is so obviously organic at the outset: “a white, wet, 
woolly-looking stuff, not unlike the albuminous part of an egg, soft-boiled.”9  
Even at the end it is “piles of moist, warm sheets” attended by a woman who 
was “a nurse formerly.”10  The workers themselves are transformed perilously by 
the mechanical process, which literally enters into their lives. 
To and fro, across, across the sharp edge, the girls forever dragged 
long strips of rags, washed white, picked from baskets at one side; 
thus ripping asunder every seam, and converting the tatters almost 
into lint.  The air swam with the fie, poisonous particles, which 
from all sides darted, subtilely, as motes in sunbeams, into the 
lungs. 
. . . . 
                                                
5 Tartarus, supra note 4, at 2293. 
6
 DIMOCK, supra note 4, at 86. 
7
 Tartarus, supra note 4, at 2287. 
8
 Id. at 2292. 
9
 Id. at 2289. 
10
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“What makes these girls so sheet-white, my lad?” 
“Why . . . I suppose the handling of such white bits of sheets all the 
time makes them so sheety.”11 
The machinery itself seems to be at the same time mechanical and alive -- 
monstrous. 
Something of awe now stole over me, as I gazed upon this 
inflexible iron animal.  Always, more or less, machinery of this 
ponderous, elaborate sort strikes, in some moods, strange dread 
into the human heart, as some living, panting Behemoth might.  
But what made the thing I saw so specially terrible to me was the 
metallic necessity, the unbudging fatality which governed it.  
Though, here and there, I could not follow the thin, gauzy vail of 
pulp in the course of its more mysterious or entirely invisible 
advance, yet it was indubitable that, at those points where it eluded 
me, it still marched on in unvarying docility to the autocratic 
cunning of the machine.12 
The paper ultimately produced is potentially of many uses.  “All sorts of 
writings would be writ on those now vacant things -- sermons, lawyers’ briefs, 
physicians’ prescriptions, love-letters, marriage certificates, bills of divorce, 
registers of births, death-warrants, and so on, without end.”13  “All sorts of 
writings” perhaps, but we quickly grasp that most of the items on the list are 
legal documents of one kind or another.14  It is this fact, I think, that is the pivot, 
the fold that brings together the two stories that Melville’s narrator tells.  The 
Tartarus is a factory; but the paradise, the dinner scene, is set specifically in 
London’s Temple precincts, formerly the domain of the Knights Templar, who 
were supplanted (after their banishment) by the Inns of Court, combination legal 
offices and lawyers’ housing.  The “bachelors” -- Melville emphasizes -- are 
lawyers, at home at work just like the paper mill “maids.”   
Does this mean we should somehow equate the situations of the lawyers 
and the factory workers?  The lawyers, at their dinner, have a wonderful time, 
eat and drink and talk exuberantly (albeit civilly).  The workers, by contrast, are 
slowly dying, victims of the machinery they serve.  Or -- more complexly -- 
should we understand the lawyers to be in some sense like the factory 
                                                
11
 Id. at 2288, 2289. 
12
 Id. at 2291-92. 
13
 Id. at 2291. 
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machinery?  Melville’s two accounts incorporate cues suggestive of this 
assimilation.  For example, the paper-making machinery is powered by the “red 
waters” of “Blood River”; the feasting lawyers “[a]ll the time, in flowing wine, . . 
. most earnestly expressed their sincerest wishes” (“the decanters galloped 
round”).15  In the mill, each woman who processes the rags which become the 
raw material for paper stands before a “vertically thrust up . . . long, glittering 
scythe, . . .  The curve of the scythe, and its having no snath to it, made it look 
exactly like a sword.”16  (It is these scythes which chop up the rags, thus creating 
the particles the women inhale.)  The sexual imagery here is obvious.17  But 
Melville’s narrator draws a conspicuously legal analogy: 
Yes, murmured I to myself; I see it now; turned outward, and each 
erected sword is so borne, edge-outward, before each girl.  If my 
reading fails me not, just so, of old, condemned state-prisoners 
went from the hall of judgment to their doom: an officer before, 
bearing a sword, its edge turned outward, in significance of their 
fatal sentence.  So, through consumptive pallors of this blank, raggy 
life, go these white girls to death.18  
The narrator’s description of his dinner with the lawyers starts with its 
location (“not far from Temple-Bar”19), evokes the Knights Templar and their 
ambiguous history, plays with the conceit of the Templars alive in contemporary 
London, and finally identifies their successors (not just in tenancy): 
But the iron heel is changed to a boot of patent-leather; the long 
two-handed sword to a one-handed quill; the monk-giver of 
gratuitous ghostly counsel now counsels for a fee; the defender of 
the sarcophagus (if in good practice with his weapon) now has 
more than one case to defend; the vowed opener and clearer of all 
highways leading to the Holy Sepulchre, now has it in particular 
charge to check, to clog, to hinder, and embarrass all the courts and 
avenues of the Law; the knight-combatant of the Saracen, breasting 
spear-points at Acre, now fights law-points in Westminster Hall.  
                                                
15
 Tartarus, supra note 4, at 2288, 2281, 2282.  
16
 Id. at 2288. 
17
 DIMOCK,  supra note 4, at 85. 
18
 Tartarus, supra note 4, at 2289. 
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The helmet is a wig.  Struck by Time’s enchanter’s Wand, the 
Templar is to-day a Lawyer.20 
First, the factory machinery is associated with swords; second, swords are 
associated with legality; and third, legality is associated with (is the successor to) 
swords.  Shouldn’t we also associate -- in some sense equate -- factory machinery 
and law and lawyers? 
What happens, what are we led to notice, if we take seriously an analogy 
of the lawyers in Paradise and the Tartarus machines?  The lawyers are machine-
like, presumably, in their work; insofar as their dealings with each other are 
patterned or repetitive, and insofar as the result is some product -- obviously 
law, or legal documents of various types.  Perhaps the dinner is a kind of 
allegory of legal process.  If so, it is easy to explain the otherwise somewhat 
curious prominence of the waiter who organizes, administers, presides over the 
feast -- “a surprising old field-marshall . . . with snowy hair and napkin, and a 
head like Socrates”21 -- and who is responsible for the decorum of the event: the 
waiter is either judge or judge’s bailiff.  That the dinner’s entertainment is not 
conversation but “all sort of pleasant stories” now matters: anecdote is, perhaps, 
a model for common law (“a sort of pell-mell, indiscriminate affair, quite baffling 
to detail in all particulars”); indeed, one among the anecdotes (presented as of a 
piece with the others) is “a funny case in law.”22  That the dinner is set in London 
is also now telling -- again, common law.   
If it is thus the common law that is (or we may suppose to be) Melville’s 
subject, then the characterizations of the paper mill machinery become 
jurisprudential criticism.  “[I]nscrutable intricacy” -- but also, we readily note, 
“metallic necessity,” “unbudging fatality,” “autocratic cunning.”  “It must go.”23  
In all of this there is also the theme of heartlessness.  It is this which is the source 
of the paradox, the essential monstrousness as it were, of the identification of the 
machinery with “some living, panting Behemoth”; it is this which Cupid, the 
factory tour guide, in effect the machinery’s spokesman, exemplifies: “More 
tragical and more inscrutably mysterious than any mystic sight, human or 
machine, throughout the factory, was the strange innocence of cruel-heartedness 
in this usage-hardened boy.”24  “[S]trange innocence,” “cruel-heartedness,” 
“usage-hardened”: this too is the monstrousness of lawyers, of the common law.  
                                                
20
 Id. at 2278. 
21
 Id. at 2281. 
22
 Id. at 2282, 2281, 2282. 
23
 Id. at 2291, 2292. 
24
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Seemingly “a city by itself,” the lawyer-templars, preoccupied by their rituals of 
self-entertainment, ignore the results: “marriage certificates, bills of divorce, 
registers of births, death-warrants, and so on, without end.”  “So, through 
consumptive pallors of this blank, raggy life, go these white girls to death.”  The 
lawyers do not care25 -- Melville’s narrator is perhaps not so much appreciative or 
envious as outraged:  
The thing called pain, the bugbear styled trouble -- those two 
legends seemed preposterous to their bachelor imaginations.  How 
could men of liberal sense, ripe scholarship in the world, and 
capacious philosophical and convivial understandings -- how could 
they suffer themselves to be imposed upon by such monkish 
fables?  Pain!  Trouble!  As well talk of Catholic miracles.  No such 
thing. -- Pass the sherry, Sir. -- Pooh, pooh!  Can’t be! -- The port, 
Sir, if you please.  Nonsense; don’t tell me so. -- The decanter stops 
with you, Sir, I believe.26 
“Systematic gaiety,” Michael Rogin observed.27  His characterization of the fate of 
the paper workers, we can see, implicates the lawyers as well.  “Mechanical 
production does not replace human labor; it takes it over.”28 
B.  
Bartleby, the Scrivener appeared in print in 1853, two years before Tartarus. 
Bartleby -- solitary, stubborn, uncooperative -- captures the reader’s 
attention.  He seems to personify something important, to stand as critique of 
something basic in economic or other social arrangements.   As every reader 
knows, Melville supplies remarkably little to work with, makes Bartleby so much 
a “man without qualities,” makes this absence of personal history so central to 
the story, that it is this absence -- this ultimate opacity -- that sticks in memory, 
making Barlteby, the Scrivener a provocative, moving riddle.   
It is always a surprise, therefore, to remember that as written Bartleby, the 
Scrivener is not first and foremost Bartleby’s story -- but rather, his unnamed 
                                                
25 See Weyler, supra note 4, at 463.  Robyn Wiegman calls attention to “the bachelors’ intellectual and moral 
bankruptcy,” Wiegman, supra note 4, at 736. 
26
 Tartarus, supra note 4, at 2282-83. 
27
 ROGIN, supra note 4, at 201. 
28
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employer’s.  “I AM a rather elderly man.”29   The narrator is a lawyer, involved 
in a transactional practice recently supplemented by work as a chancery master 
(taking testimony, etc.).  It is because of the new business that Bartleby comes on 
the scene: 
Now my original business -- that of a conveyancer and title hunter, 
and drawer-up of recondite documents of all sorts -- was 
considerably increased by receiving the master’s office.  There was 
now great work for scriveners.  Not only must I push the clerks 
already with me, but I must have additional help.  In answer to my 
advertisement, a motionless young man one morning, stood upon 
my office threshold, the door being open, for it was summer.  I can 
see that figure now -- pallidly neat, pitiably respectable, incurably 
forlorn!  It was Bartleby.30   
By this point in the story, about a quarter of the way through, readers have had 
the chance to become well too acquainted with the narrator: he is, as Melville sets 
things up, speaking directly, full (too full) of good humor, self-satisfaction, and a 
certain cluelessness.  The other employees -- and their barnyard nicknames 
(Turkey, Nippers, Ginger Nut) -- are already characterized at length, and the day 
to day, ordinary skirmishing that is part of the business of managing scriveners 
has become clear.  It is something like the politics of organizing the efforts of 
temperamental working animals (we find it easy to suppose that this is how the 
narrator conceives of it). 
 From this point, Melville presents the famous account of Bartleby’s oddly 
limited work routines (“I would prefer not to”), his use of the office as living 
quarters, and his employer’s difficulty in devising a successful way to remove 
him from the premises.  The narrator sketches his several strategies.  He asserts 
hierarchy:  “Bartleby, quick, I am waiting.”31  He gives reasons for his 
requirements (or requests):  “These are your own copies we are about to 
examine.  It is labor saving to you. . . .  It is common usage.”32  He treats Bartleby 
as an equal, as a gentleman:  “I am pained, Bartleby.  I had thought better of you.  
                                                
29
 Herman Melville, Bartleby, the Scrivener, 1 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE 2234 
(4th ed. 1994). 
30
 Id. at 2238. 
31
 Id. at 2240.; For a brilliant, provocative discussion stressing Bartleby himself, identifying him with both 
the work and the implicit jurisprudence of his employer’s chancery business, see CORNELIA VISSMAN, 
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I had imagined you of such a gentlemanly organization, that in any delicate 
dilemma slight hint would suffice.”33 
But in the end the narrator succeeds by treating Bartleby as a legal 
problem -- as a problem to be solved transactionally, through means 
commonplace in the narrator’s own practice.  We witness the narrator thinking 
like a lawyer: 
What! surely you will not have him collared by a constable, and 
commit his innocent pallor to the common jail?  And upon what 
ground could you procure such a thing to be done? -- a vagrant, is 
he?  What! he a vagrant, a wanderer, who refuses to budge?  It is 
because he will not be a vagrant then, that you seek to count him as 
a vagrant.  That is too absurd.  No visible means of support: there I 
have him.  Wrong again: for indubitably he does support himself, 
and this is the only unanswerable proof that any man can show of 
his possessing the means so to do.  No more then.  Since he will not 
quit me, I must quit him.  I will change my offices; I will move 
elsewhere; and give him fair notice, that if I find him on my new 
premises I will then proceed against him as a common trespasser.34 
Bartleby, of course, does not leave the old office.  The narrator now finds himself 
legally positioned to deny any obligation in the face of protests by the landlord 
and the new tenant.  “[B]ut, really, the man you allude to is nothing to me -- he is 
no relation or apprentice of mine, that you should hold me responsible for 
him.”35  And thus, when the landlord summoned the police, who arrested 
Bartleby and incarcerated him in the prison within which he would shortly die, 
the narrator acquiesced: 
When again I entered my office, lo, a note from the landlord lay 
upon the desk. . . .  It informed me that the writer had sent to the 
police, and had Bartleby removed to the Tombs as a vagrant. . . .  At 
first I was indignant; but at last almost approved.  The landlord’s 
energetic, summary disposition had led him to adopt a procedure 
which I do not think I would have decided upon myself; and yet as 
a last resort, under such peculiar circumstances, it seemed the only 
plan.36 
                                                
33
 Id. at 2250. 
34
 Id. at 2253. 
35 Id. at 2254. 
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Ordinary legal transactions, altogether unremarkable, possess dramatic 
power.  The narrator, having hired Bartleby to produce legal documents, realizes 
that he can rid himself of Bartleby (who refuses to leave after termination of 
employment), through execution of one or two such documents -- a notice to 
terminate a lease, and a new lease in a new building.  Or so we may assume 
reading Bartleby the story within the point of view of its narrator -- he barely 
alludes to the details of the transaction in fact, censors reference to the pertinence 
of his own expertise (not surprisingly, given his commitment to denying 
responsibility for Bartleby’s fate).  With the narrator now legally irrelevant, 
Bartleby becomes a trespasser and is removed to jail at the behest of the landlord.   
What ought we to conclude?   
 (a) It is more important to be a subject of -- to figure in -- legal documents 
than to be a maker of such documents.  This is what the narrator finally realizes.  
He gives up asserting his law office authority -- his own status within the office -- 
and becomes instead his own client.  Law is applied reflexively to regulate the 
process of its own production.  People become paper.  Bartleby -- the story -- thus 
conjoins or overlaps the two stories juxtaposed in Melville’s Tartarus. 
 (b) Or rather:  in Tartarus the workers become physically like paper in a 
process of manufacture which seems at the same time oddly biological (indeed 
sexual); paper also becomes like people.  In Bartleby people matter only insofar as 
they are acknowledged on paper -- become marks on paper.  There is no need to 
depict this process as remarkable, as in Tartarus -- it’s just writing, so matter of 
fact as to disappear into the background within the story -- become its 
documentary substrate, as it were -- and not its decisive action.37 
(c) In Tartarus, in both parts, there is an intense sense of presence.  Melville  
seems to mean to convey a feeling of what it’s like for the narrator to be there, a 
feeling of both place and people.  This feeling is not an impression of particular 
persons as distinct individuals; rather, it is a depiction of the narrator’s 
perceptions -- point of view is pronounced.  From the standpoint of the narrator, 
the principal impression is supersaturation:  what’s perceived is too vivid, too 
evocative, over-wrought -- too much.  Bartleby is very different.  The narrator 
initially evokes a similar sense of heightened local color in describing his office 
and its occupants.  But Bartleby refuses to act in a way which can be brought 
within this thick description.  He possesses no detail.  And in the end, the 
narrator must deal with Bartleby by abstracting -- by reducing the office to its 
bare legal identity as property subject to transfer. 
                                                
37
 People in Bartleby are often depicted enclosed -- in the office, in the carriage, in prison.  It’s something 





J.L. & Interdisc. Stud. (2011) 
   
  27 
 
(d) The narrator realizes that the office is -- or may at any time be treated 
as -- nothing more than what it is on paper.  If so, then the office -- and its 
occupants -- are subject to the manipulations paper makes possible.  Specifically, 
paper tends to plurality -- it’s “sheety” (the vivid term in Tartarus): one 
document leads to another, becomes subject to the logic of documentary 
relationships (addition, modification, substitution, etc.).38 
(e) The movement of the story is also a progression from hierarchy (the 
narrator’s relationship with his long-time employees -- rustic squire-archy) 
through equality (the narrator’s effort to deal with Bartleby as an individual 
subject to persuasion -- and Bartleby’s seizure of the opportunity to refuse 
consent) to formality.  The politics of paper is not necessarily either hierarchical 
or egalitarian although it might be either.  It both supports and undercuts both 
usual status arrangements. 
II. Bernhard, Accumulating Paper, Correction 
Correction purports to tell the story of Roithamer, who decides to spend 
his inheritance constructing a house for his sister, located at the exact center of a 
large forest.39  The house is built in the shape of a cone (and named accordingly: 
“the Cone”).  Roithamer does not discuss this project with his sister, who 
becomes ill and dies shortly after visiting the Cone for the first time.  He commits 
suicide.  Thomas Bernhard spends surprisingly little space in Correction filling in 
the details of these events.  Rather, the text presents two streams of 
consciousness.  The first consists of the thoughts of Roithamer’s literary executor 
(never identified by name).  The second stream is as an accumulation of 
Roithamer’s attempts to explain his project and himself, before and after his 
sister’s illness and death, indeed down to just before his suicide. 
In all of this, at scattered points but nonetheless prominently, 
documentary multiplicity figures as a preoccupation.  Bernhard and Melville are 
cousins in a way.   For example, this is a passage in Correction attributed to 
Roithamer, notably specifically legal in its reference: 
[B]ut in fact the world is only held together by a patchwork of 
contracts, as we soon perceive, and in this network of hundreds 
and thousands and hundreds of thousands and millions and 
billions of contracts the trapped human beings are squirming.  
There’s no way to get around contracts except by suicide.  
                                                
38 This paperly abstraction seems somehow of a piece (as it were) with the beautiful abstract patterns which 
show up in Bartleby in the descriptions of the office -- the black and white opposition -- and the prison -- 
the arrangement of brown and green. 
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Contracts everywhere, they’ve already choked everything to death, 
a whole world choking to death on its contracts, so Roithamer.  To 
suppose that it is possible to exist without contracts or other 
written agreements and run away, anywhere at all, is to find 
ourselves soon caught again in contracts and written agreements, 
anyone who thinks otherwise is a madman, a malicious falsifier of 
the nature of things.  It’s only in childhood that we don’t know 
what kind of a trap it is in which we squirm and despair and keep 
on despairing as we go on squirming in it, ignorant that these are 
the nets of contracts and other written agreements made by the 
grown-ups, by history.  If anyone were to succeed in doing away 
with all these contracts and other written agreements, all he’d have 
accomplished would be the end of the whole world.  In the future, 
where everything is possible, this too is possible.  But so far it 
hasn’t been possible, nor is it possible in the immediate future, so 
Roithamer, the foreseeable future is all contracts, written 
agreements, and the resulting fits of despair, impediments, 
sicknesses, causes of death, that’s all.  Our entire being is tied to 
contracts, written agreements, assessments, we’re trapped in them 
for life, no matter what we do, no matter who we are.  Still we keep 
trying all our lives to escape from these contracts and other written 
agreements, efforts as painful as they are senseless, so Roithamer.40  
On other occasions multiplicity becomes a methodological prerequisite. 
Documentary profusion calls attention to or indeed shapes the form of possible 
attempts at coming to grips, at “perspective,” at ordering or making progress.  
Thus Roithamer also reports: 
I had squirreled away in Hoeller’s garret every conceivable book 
and paper I could lay hands on and that could be of use to me, as 
well as all the books and papers I could do without, and I’d torn 
the pages I most valued out of these essential books and papers and 
tacked them on the walls of Hoeller’s garret, pages of Pascal, for 
instance, again and again, much of Montaigne, very many pages of 
Pushkin and Schopenhauer, of Novalis and Dostoyevsky, I’d 
tacked almost all the pages of Valery’s M. Teste on the walls before 
I’d covered the walls of Hoeller’s garret with my plans and 
sketches for building the Cone; to gain perspective I’ve always 
pasted or tacked all the papers important to me on my walls, even 
as a child I’d covered the walls of my room in Altensam with other 
people’s most important (to me) ideas, pasted or tacked on, so I’d 
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first covered the walls of Hoeller’s garret with the most important 
sayings of Pascal and Novalis and Montaigne, before I’d tacked 
them up and pasted them up with my sketches and anyway all 
kinds of ideas for building the Cone, and so I always could 
immediately clear out of Altensam and move into Hoeller’s garret 
and find refuge in Hoeller’s garret in those thoughts on the walls of 
Hoeller’s garret, the fact that it is possible for me to go to Hoeller’s 
garret where I always found everything I needed for my thoughts 
and reflections, all those thoughts of other men and through them, 
also all my own thoughts.41  
Profusion creates crisis for the literary executor.  He accidentally tosses 
together all of the collections of Rothamer’s papers that he had carefully acquired 
and kept separate -- as a result, in the course of contemplating the confusion, the 
executor abandons the editorial project he had originally planned: 
For me to bring together all these bits and pieces, perhaps to put 
them in the right relation to each other so as to make a whole out of 
all these bits and pieces of his thought, something to be published, 
was out of the question, for I’d had to consider, from my first 
contact with Roithamer’s papers, that they consist for the most part 
of mere fragments which he had intended to combine into a whole 
himself, after completing or perfecting . . . the Cone. . . .  So what 
we have here are in fact hundreds, or thousands, of fragments 
which Roithamer left to me, but which I shall not edit, because I 
have no right to edit them, anyway no one has a right, no matter 
who is editing what, he never has a right to do it . . .  I shall not 
commit this editorial crime, . . . I shall put Roithamer’s papers in 
order, sift them, then possibly pass them on to his publisher, . . .  I 
would sort and sift Roithamer’s legacy, . . . but I will not edit it I 
won’t change a line, I won’t move a comma, I shall sort and sift it.42  
This passage is strikingly jurisprudential.  “[R]ight relation” becomes “right to 
edit,” or rather “no right” -- “this editorial crime.”  Why?  Why is it proper to 
“put Roithamer’s papers in order,” to “sort and sift,” but not to “change a line” 
or “move a comma”?  In either case, we might think, the aim is the same, “to 
make a whole out of all these bits and pieces of his thought.”  Or perhaps this is 
the “editorial crime” -- to present the executor’s own readings (own 
interpretations) as though they were Roitnamer’s own.  The “bits and pieces” 
need therefore to be respected, to be left unchanged within their own terms, left 
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as “mere fragments,” to be “sort[ed] and sift[ed],” “order[ed]” to this extent, but 
no more.  
*  *  *  *  * 
Scruples such as these, notably, are not matters for special attention within 
the main line of modern legal theory -- in the United States and Great Britain, 
anyway.   
Jeremy Bentham recognized the problem that a multiplicity of instruments 
might create, calling attention to the proliferation of statutes in particular: 
At present such is the entanglement, that when a new statute is 
applied it is next to impossible to follow it through and discern the 
limits of its influence. As the laws amidst which it falls are not to be 
distinguished from one another, there is no saying which of them it 
repeals or qualifies, nor which of them it leaves untouched: it is like 
water poured into the sea.43 
But for Bentham, the solution lay precisely in what Roithamer’s executor thought 
to be “editorial crime,” a wrenching exercise in both rearranging and rewriting: 
Take then on the one hand all the imperative provisions belonging 
to the several laws that compose the code, add together their 
respective amplitudes: take on the other hand all the qualificative 
provisions belonging to the same laws, add together in like manner 
their respective amplitudes, on the other side; from the sum of the 
one combined with the sum of the other results the general 
character of the whole system.44 
Two centuries later, Joseph Raz echoes Bentham: 
There is no one-to-one correlation, or any other regular correlation 
between law-making activities and rules of law. . . .  Rules, 
especially long-standing rules, are often the product of a variety of 
law-creating acts, some legislative some judicial, fashioning the 
current rule, changing and developing it, over time.  Similarly, 
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single acts of legislation, like the passing of one Act by the 
legislature, typically create or modify more than one rule.45  
Jules Coleman proceeds similarly, tersely characterizing legal instruments as 
such as simply objects, as pretty much raw materials. “There are at least two 
components to a theory of legal content.  The first is the set of official 
pronouncements; the second is a function that operates on those 
pronouncements to generate the content of the law.”46    
Ronald Dworkin also follows Bentham’s lead. Dworkin understands his 
own approach to be “interpretation,” but he too would move past the 
documentary stage as such to what he regards as the real work of articulating 
and assessing normatively basic complexes of principles: 
First, there must be a “preinterpretive“ stage in which the rules and 
standards taken to provide the tentative content of the practice are 
identified.  (The equivalent stage in literary interpretation is the 
stage at which discrete novels, plays, and so forth are identified 
textually, that is, the stage at which the text of Moby-Dick is 
identified and distinguished from the text of other novels.)  I 
enclose “pre-interpretive” in quotes because some kind of 
interpretation is necessary even at this stage. . . .  But a very great 
deal of consensus is needed -- perhaps an interpretive community 
is usefully defined as requiring consensus at this stage -- if the 
interpretive attitude is to be fruitful, and we may therefore abstract 
from this stage in our analysis by presupposing that the 
classifications it yields are treated as given in day-to-day reflection 
and argument.47 
Dworkin recognizes, but appears to take as given, whatever is involved in 
distinguishing “the” legal text at hand from “other” legal texts.  In working with 
particular documents, at least on some occasions, he also describes the text as 
such in bare bones terms, leaving as large a role as possible (we might think) for 
interpretation: 
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 JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION 5, 6 (2009).  Leslie Green’s summary, we can 
see, is rightly carefully balanced: “The law begins and ends with the sources -- the statutes, cases, and 
conventions, insofar as their existence and content can be ascertained by reference to matters of social fact 
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Green, Three Themes From Raz, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 504 (2005). 
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We have a constitutional text.  We do not disagree about which 
inscriptions comprise that text; nobody argues about which series 
of letters and spaces make it up.  But, of course, identifying a 
canonical series of letters and spaces is only the beginning of 
interpretation.  For there remains the problem of what any 
particular portion of that series means.48 
“[C]anonical terms . . . provide a limit,” an “important” limit.49  But not all terms 
in use in Dworkin’s interpretive exercises are strictly canonical, come into play 
and encounter whatever limits that emerge not because of the constraining effect 
of a particular document as such, but because of the form or content of the 
notions in play themselves.  As a result, “sorting” and “sifting” à la Bernhard’s 
narrator in Correction is now not a matter of documents but of ideas: 
In fact, judges often disagree not simply about how some rule or 
principle should be interpreted, but whether the rule or principle 
one judge cites should be acknowledged to be a rule or principle at 
all. . . . [T]he argument for a particular rule may be more important 
than the argument from that rule to the particular case . . .50 
*  *  *  *  * 
It is difficult not to ask questions:  Is Bethamite separation really necessary? 
Must “legal material”51 be so strenuously reworked to put it in usable form?  
Construction of a “whole system,” a well-defined arrangement of legal 
propositions displacing original legal materials, may be one appropriate way of 
proceeding -- but maybe not the only course. The ordinary plurality of legal 
materials describes an accumulating, shifting environment (Melville and 
Bernhard restated as matter-of-factly as possible).  Is this instability only 
confounding chaos or noise?  Or might we imagine a paper tectonics, a way of 
acknowledging the recurring “bits and pieces,” a recurring need to “sort and 
sift” -- in this way rework our own expectations, and ultimately legal strategies?  
Perhaps Bernhard’s narrator, coming to grips with his own mistake, in fact 
describes the right approach.   
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III. Paper Tectonics?  The Documentary Substrate and Its Instabilities 
“Legal studies lack any reflection on their tools.”  Suppose that Cornelia 
Vismann is wrong.52  Consider -- as if a sequence of observations in some sense 
implicit in the juxtaposition of Melville and Berhard I have just pushed together: 
Legal documents are understood to be delimited or bounded, but only 
provisionally so, always at risk of decomposition into sequences of documents or 
subsumption within some more encompassing document. A constitution or 
statute or contract might be considered as pertinent in its entirety: taken as 
whole.  Or a particular article or section or sentence or phrase or particular 
words might be understood -- in isolation -- as the relevant text.  Analysis might, 
of course, move back and forth between narrower and broader document 
specifications.  Documents within their own terms may include statements 
asserting norms derived from all sorts of sources -- expressed, for example, as 
rights and duties; depicted as rules, principles, or policies, for example.  The 
content of such normative statements, it may appear (sometimes, anyway) varies 
depending upon the definition of documentary boundaries.  Legal work is 
kaleidoscopic. Documents fall into patterns vulnerable to rearrangement. There 
can be no necessary starting point or conclusion. Some patterns may persist or 
recur, and particular patterns -- so long as they persist -- may define hierarchies. 
Patterns are always provisional. Aggregated or individually, documents are not 
necessarily complete or coherent. Overlaps, gaps, inconsistencies, and 
ambiguities are common. 
These assertions suggest, among other things, that law -- insofar as its 
elaborations have consequences -- may be a means of either ordering or 
disrupting. A given document might be understood as tantamount to a direct 
description of fundamental moral, political, economic, or cultural “facts,” and 
therefore foundational, precisely fixing legal order. But this understanding might 
also provoke a counter-politics recalling the “merely” documentary status of 
postulated legal order, proposing to replace one document with another.  Or in 
circumstances in which norms are not otherwise cemented, legal articulation 
may work to highlight or emphasize, and therefore work to affirm or establish 
norms, motivating political, popular, or cultural support, putting off subsequent 
legal revision even if such revision is not entirely precluded. Even if legal 
materials appear to acknowledge, for example, extant cultural or economic 
norms, the instability of legal forms may open ways to undercut these norms. 
The legal “field” (the materials that might be conceived as supplying the setting 
or ground for legal arguments and conclusions) tends toward “flux” (the 
recurring composition, decomposition, and recomposition of legal materials). 
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In any particular legal exercise, these dynamics may influence analysis 
side-by-side with immediate, independent considerations of content. Much more 
of ordinary law is concerned with textual prerequisites or relations than we 
might at first suppose. For example, statutes, judicial opinions, constitutions, 
regulations, contracts, and treaties are depicted as defined, individuated, limited 
somehow in content, as ones among many and are also routinely broken into 
parts or subsumed (in whole or in part) into larger aggregates. Thus, one statute 
may displace another statute, or accommodate another’s content; a statute may 
limit administrative interpretation or take its own content from that 
interpretation; a statute may limit common law or be understood to codify it.53  
In the course of fixing these relations, particular terms may acquire prominence 
or may recede. Consequently, these ordering exercises may change our 
understanding of pertinent content.  In every instance, there is, therefore, a 
formal politics -- even if often routine. Law “is”-- comes into being within the 
perspective of this politics -- because of the congruence of document 
specifications and conditions of salience. Documents exhibiting this congruence 
become “legal instruments.”  Document specifications are component parts of 
would-be instruments -- what is and what is not included within a given 
document. Conditions of salience are criteria that document specifications do or 
do not meet. Matches of salience conditions and documentary characteristics 
generate apologetics; mismatches generate critiques. 
Matches and mismatches are equally plausible states. Neither apologetics 
nor critique may claim priority.  This formal politics and whatever norms figure 
in the content of particular documents may also interact, of course. Documentary 
shifts and dictates of content might compete in claiming priority.  Or a pluralist 
pressure could manifest itself -- a tendency for differing contents to co-exist 
rather than displace or recede -- paralleling the formal preoccupation with 
differentiating legal documents. Dictates of content might prevail by and large, 
and the content dictated might be relatively uniform or harmonious.  But it is 
also possible that the formal politics might sharply fragment documentary 
contents. Legal normativity is consequently complex. 
IV. Legal Freedom as Such     
In Leviathan Thomas Hobbes famously depicted freedom (or liberty) as 
exterior to law, and as primarily a negative notion: a way of referring to the 
range of choices that the law itself did not specify.  Joseph Raz proceeded 
oppositely in one important respect in his Morality of Freedom,54 developing 
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conceptions of freedom and personal autonomy rich in (sometimes surprising) 
positive content. But Raz -- not unlike Hobbes -- also supposes that law itself is 
not the medium within which the idea of freedom immediately or directly 
acquires defining content.  Law is quintessentially an assertion and expression of 
authority, insofar as it is accepted (a key question for both Raz and Hobbes, of 
course), and therefore the logic of “institutionalization” comes first, definition 
and protection of legal rights of individual choice following thereafter.    “[B]eing 
institutionalized one is not at liberty, assuming the institution is based on 
legitimate authority, to act on one’s own judgment as to the proper weight of the 
interest where it differs from that of the authority.”55  But what if the content of 
law itself is, as we have seen, at one level always a matter in question, if the 
question of pertinent materials is always open to re-resolution?  In recent 
writing, Raz acknowledges something like this possibility as holding with regard 
to interpretation of norms -- legal content somehow extracted and abstracted 
from immediate legal instruments.  In the end, however, his discussion of 
“pluralism and innovation” reverts to “authority,” to the primacy of institutional 
considerations.   
Jean-Luc Nancy resets “freedom,” considers it as a distinctive 
“experience” -- and in the process suggests terms that attach greater significance 
to interpretive freedom as such.56  He begins with a proposition with which Raz 
(for example) would not disagree: 
Freedom cannot be presented as the autonomy of a subjectivity in 
charge of itself and of its decisions, evolving freely and in perfect 
independence from every obstacle.  What would such an 
independence mean, if not the impossibility in principle of entering 
into the slightest relation -- and therefore of exercising the slightest 
freedom?57   
Raz proceeds by understanding freedom as the individual’s opportunity to 
choose across a range of more or less already given “social forms” of expression, 
interaction, and thus obligation, all originating in the community at large.58  
Nancy, in contrast, particularizes “relationships,” stresses the idea that 
interactions always present themselves, at the moment, as unique or distinctive 
vis-à-vis all other possibilities:   
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Singularity consists in the “just once, this time,” whose mere 
enunciation . . . establishes a relation at the same time that it 
infinitely hollows out the time and space that are supposed to be 
“common” around the point of enunciation.  At this point, it is each 
time freedom that is singularly born.59    
Freedom therefore becomes first of all a characteristic of a state of affairs -- the 
experience of possibility, in advance (as it were) of the experience of assumption 
of obligation: 
[T]he originary setting into relation is contemporaneous and 
coextensive with freedom insofar as freedom is the discrete play of 
the interval, offering the space of play wherein the “each time” 
takes place: the possibility of an irreducible singularity occurring, 
one that is not free in the sense of being endowed with a power of 
autonomy . . . but that is already free in the sense that it occurs in 
the free space and spacing of time where only the singular one time 
is possible. . . .  Freedom is that which spaces and singularizes -- or 
which singularizes itself.60  
It is this idea -- freedom conceived as expressed or realized in the degrees 
of freedom presented by an environment -- that allows legal freedom to be both 
recognized and regarded as not anomalous, as structurally integral and therefore 
potentially affirmatively valued.  Legally as in other settings, we might think, an 
individual’s capacity to control circumstances is tied to -- depends upon the 
extent to which -- the individual’s ability to arrange and rearrange the priority or 
proximity of various legally defined contexts, posing various risks and 
opportunities.  Legally, these contexts present themselves as complexes of norms 
and associated institutions, which individuals might find to be more or less apt, 
or (characterized pragmatically) better or worse settings within which to 
maneuver in pursuit of chosen goals.61  Freedom in law becomes at least in part 
freedom to choose law.   
This is not a new notion.  The idea of freedom of contract, for example, in 
its radical Jacksonian/Reconstruction versions, was plainly understood as a 
chance to put in place -- to put a legal instrument to work to establish as decisive 
-- one’s own sets of relationships; a freedom therefore corrosive of relationships 
regarded as already fixed -- as in effect dictated -- by status.  To be sure, it soon 
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seemed obvious to many that important contractual undertakings and therefore 
the governing terms of relationships are often enough at the mercy of 
movements (market circumstances or the like) outside any one individual’s 
control, at least past certain quickly reached points.  Statutory and common law 
arrangements came to be understood often, although hardly ever without 
dissent, as alternative origins of possibility, means through which individuals 
might extend their efforts at control, either directly through litigation or 
indirectly in the wake of governmentally initiated administrative or adjudicative 
processes.  Of course, these alternative arrangements are as vulnerable as 
freedom of contract to the risk of interpretive truncation – sometimes making 
possible recognition of individual or legislative power to critique and remake, 
but also sometimes affording cover (in effect) for elaborate apologetics ordering 
and reestablishing a restrictive status quo.62   
Questions concerning modes of interpreting particular legal instruments, 
and as importantly, anterior questions concerning which instruments to treat as 
applicable, become occasions indicative of the degree to which given documents 
further the project of legal freedom or some other agenda -- in the aggregate, of 
course, suggesting something about the commitments of the legal regime overall.  
Within these terms, it is apparent that legal instruments in and of themselves are 
plausibly conceived as real, albeit complex units of analysis.  They are potentially 
ultimate subjects of inquiry, in parallel with Hohfeldian, Dworkinian or other 
conceptual descriptions of legal norms in terms of rights, duties, principles, 
policies, etc.  Individual instruments may be usefully considered as “possible 
worlds,” as it were; each in principle describing a field or environment within 
which legal arrangements are constituted or, more crucially, reconstituted.  To be 
sure, this formal doubling may not be acknowledged.  One way in which the 
interplay of the documentary substrate and abstracted surface jurisprudences 
sometimes comes to conclusion in particular settings precisely involves emphatic 
denials of documentary multiplicity.  Bentham prevails: it is as though legal 
instruments are simply fragments of law, revealing parts of underlying “real” 
legal concepts.  There is no reason to suppose, however, that this conclusion is 
itself anything other than “fragmentary,” as likely occasional rather than 
thorough-going. 
Individuals bringing suit or drafting or otherwise acting legally have the 
opportunity to call into question, to repoliticize, usual patterns.  It is clear, for 
example, that the formalization of litigation has as one of its effects precisely a 
highlighting, arguably an exaggeration, of triggering circumstances.  But more 
generally, legal instruments may be understood as reopening the question of 
structure not only to resolve the particular case, but also to assert (or reassert) the 
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relevance of triggering, now reconstitutive concerns.  Stressing this reconstitutive 
possibility obviously evokes Bruce Ackerman’s view of constitutional politics.  
But there is also a crucial difference.  The “constitutional moments” recur, do not 
reduce to “normal” working out of past crisis and resolution, instead re-
instantiate the original crisis as it were, inserting past politics into present 
practice.  There is no bright line between either past and present or ordinary and 
constitutional politics.  At least some statutes, and other legal instruments as 
well, do not necessarily fit comfortably into an overall legal scene.  They may be 
understood and brought to bear, instead, to call into question precisely that 
which, legally, is otherwise validated. 
V. The Theater of Confrontation 
Complex formal competition obliquely suggests a distinctive model of 
society -- something like a substantive counterpart, if only glimpsed in general 
outline.  This model often competes for priority with other models implicit in the 
peculiar content of particular legal documents.  Such struggle, where it occurs, is 
irreducible. 
Within law, within the perspective implicit in the idea of the unstable 
documentary substrate:  
Social transformations appear to be utterly contingent, never settled, 
always at issue; no form of social integration, once emerged, relinquishes its 
claim to priority.  Discourse, legal or otherwise, mirroring and prefiguring this 
irrepressible conflict, is always itself a theater of confrontation.  Sincere efforts at 
reaching understanding can never definitively establish themselves free from 
challenge, and can therefore maintain themselves only by also building upon 
“forceful” strategic postures and (successful) imaginative constructions. Legal 
institutions are on the one hand the scene of conflict, as other forms of social 
integration present themselves as sources of ideas of order, within the legal 
setting appearing as simultaneously foreign and familiar.  But legal ideas are also 
aggressive.  They purport to reinterpret other social phenomena or regimes in 
jurisprudential terms.  The question as to how law reconciles itself with other 
social forms defies settling answer. 
Recurring formulations often framed in terms of rules or standards or 
other abstracted forms are commonplace in law, accumulating continuously in 
multitudes of legal documents.  Some of these secondary vocabularies are 
routine -- invoked as a matter of course.63  Others are consciously considered and 
actively worked out.  The various constructions sometimes extend across 
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otherwise highly fragmented legal domains.  These bridging formulas may 
exhibit distinctive, relatively definite (if never definitive) orientations and 
acquire a presence or status of their own -- as “doctrine,” we sometimes say, or 
perhaps more accurately, as indexes, as organizing markers.64 It is also easy, 
however, to pick out what might be shown to be distortions -- disguises and 
displacements -- endemic in such second order formulas (“legal fictions,” as it 
were).  The result may be an accumulating mix of organizing terms, some 
understood as problematic and others not at any given time, all subject to 
challenge, recurring problems or questions therefore. Multiple, fragmented levels 
and attendant, sometimes orienting, sometimes distorting formulations and 
reformulations: we might think of these phenomena as equivalents of fault lines, 
mappable features accordingly.  This shaky assembly may come closest to 
approximating stable ground within a legal regime like that of the United States. 
The legal complex itself65 -- the composite interacting levels of indexing 
and synthesis -- is thus chronically out of joint.  There may be good reason, as a 
result, to re-situate efforts like those of Ernest Weinrib or Ronald Dworkin or 
Herbert Wechsler to identify notions of coherence or integrity or neutrality or 
such as distinctly governing “legal” values.  Orientations, even if recurring, may 
be fragmentary, artifacts of interactions across syntheses that are always 
vulnerable to challenge. “Values” are not legal fundamentals.  If anything, 
accumulating legal materials routinely work, or are chronically prone to work, to 
put in question, counter, over-simplify, over-qualify, or otherwise undercut 
values appearing “in” law. 
There is, however, no reason why participants in legal regimes cannot 
press “internal” values like coherence or integrity or neutrality, just as they 
might press any other values, subject to the counter-efforts of other participants 
and the fragmenting and distorting effects of the various accumulating and 
interacting legal indexes and syntheses.  A legal regime is thus a political 
environment (in effect complete with “weather”) of a distinctive sort.  There is no 
mechanism akin to vote counting or market clearing routinely weeding “losing” 
positions out of the regime as a whole.66  There is no thorough-going Habermas-
like bar to strategy, theater, or disingenuousness.  Assertions of “internal” 
norms, like other claims, run risks of fragmentation and distortion, and the 
                                                
64  For further discussion of the idea and role of “index terms” in legal corpora, see Patrick O. Gudridge, 
Complexity and Contradiction in Florida Constitutional Law, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 879, 907-10 (2010); An 
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Karpik & Malcolm M. Feeley, eds., 2007). 
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countering efforts of opposing participants.  It might be that the appeal of 
coherence or integrity or neutrality is enhanced in an environment of this sort, 
and will emerge (sometimes, anyway) in the course of interacting syntheses.67  
But such values do not figure as presuppositions -- rather, as results. 
*  *  *  *  * 
If certain questions and problems appear within the legal complex as 
coming closest to resembling common ground, it is not only because such 
questions recur.  Proposed answers not only repeatedly appear to be attractive, 
but are also often revealed to incorporate displacements or disguises, to make 
decisive use of what appears to be tellingly truncated content. Exercises in 
exposure -- obviously along side recurring assertions of particular “answers” -- 
keep questions open, and at least potentially relevant. Internal instability, rather -
- more precisely, the persistence of unresolved problems, and the accompanying, 
repeated perception of too simple responses -- is the register of continuity, a 
measure of recurring use, and thus (however paradoxical this may seem to be) 
the organizing form for legal order.  Precisely simultaneously, it is also the 
organizing form for dissent: the hint, at least, of the possibility of legal 
opposition. 
We might imagine, therefore, a legal seismics.  Instead of understanding 
legal theory as a search for order taking the form of settled understandings, 
doctrine, neutral principle, integrity, base-and-superstructure, etc. -- it may make 
more sense to try to gauge instability.  Sometimes the push and pull of recurring 
conflicts indeed ends in radical fragmentation, to the point no patterning is more 
than momentary.  But sometimes push and pull interweave (as it were), persist, 
and over a course of time conflicting forces acquire increasing internal 
lamination or definition or elaboration.  This is an order of sorts, we might think, 
even if never settled.  Some sort of diagnostics, some account of transitions might 
become conceivable, a way not only to recognize tremors, but to put them in 
perspective vis-à-vis each other -- theoretical order at least.      
VI. Written, Not Read? 
And ye are complete in him, which is the head of all principalitie, & 
power. . . .  And you being dead in your sinnes, and the 
vncircumcision of your flesh, hath hee quickened together with 
him, hauing forgiuen you all trespasses, [b]lotting out the 
handwriting of ordinances, that was against vs, which was contrary 
to vs, and tooke it out of the way, nayling it to his Crosse:  And 
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hauing spoyled principalities and powers, he made a shew of them 
openly, triumphing ouer them in it.68 
Sometimes judges write watershed opinions whose deep logic only 
gradually becomes clear and whose language fails to capture that 
deep logic. In such cases, there is no need for courts and scholars to 
cling to the original language of the opinions, at least where 
abandoning the original language would clarify matters without 
loss of content.69 
The idea that texts give way, are somehow deficient and somehow 
superseded, recurs -- provoking opposition to be sure, but opposition itself 
tending to become embattled, caught in the suspicion that invocations of texts 
ultimately turn into references to other entities, “original intent” or whatnot: 
versions once more of faith or reason.  If persuasive, this proposition calls into 
question the premise here.  “Documentary substrates,” “paper tectonics,” and 
their concomitants matter much less, it seems, if texts are sideshows, if the real 
work draws on texts little or not at all.  Accumulating documents become, in and 
of themselves pretty much beside the point.  Jeremy Bentham, the epistle-writer 
given sixteenth century English translation, and Matthew Stephenson and 
Adrian Vermeule -- all are right. 
Then why write?  If documents are (at most) points of departure, to be 
quickly scanned to identify topics addressed thereafter in ways making only 
occasional, illustrative or ornamental use of document terms, is the surface 
complexity of so many legal documents -- in the aggregate and also often 
individually -- a kind of noise or static or froth?  But if this is not right, what 
must we suppose?  Put too generally: there is -- we need to think there is -- 
something important made possible by modes of reading that take seriously 
documentary complexity.   
Sometimes documents are simply records of deals or bargains and 
complexity is a kind of optical illusion, lying in the transactional juxtaposition of 
so many desired outcomes sought by so many parties.  There is no “there there” 
independent of the list, no consistency or inconsistency or unity or conflict.  It 
may be entirely appropriate, as Frank Easterbrook among others has argued, to 
deal with legal conjunctions of this sort by adopting interpretive biases aimed at 
motivating drafters to define straightforwardly the accumulating individual 
items.  It is also true that documents may not be written, entirely or in part, to be 
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definitive.  Their provisions work to transfer responsibility from their drafters to 
other institutions or individuals, authorize some next set of documents to 
address matters at hand largely if not entirely autonomously.  Efforts to read 
closely, therefore, to seek out intricacy and its implications rather than outlines of 
general topics, become in these cases misplaced as well.  There needs to be a 
third type.   
Consider:  Documents may be at times conceived as records of engagement.  
They present themselves -- or may be read -- as efforts to come to grips with 
matters not reducible to distributive lists.  These at least momentarily intractable 
matters, it would appear, elude definitive resolution but nonetheless demand 
attention, it seems, in ways that acknowledge the outlines of difficulty, mark 
aspects of the given conflict that attempted resolutions should address.  These 
documents are not algorithms -- steps to resolution.  They are instead something 
like maps of possible emphases: highlightings, sometimes competing and 
sometimes consistent -- without, however, definitive relief, as though the 
question of relative prominence remains open, so long as the several 
highlightings remain more or less apparent. 
 Readers of complex legal documents are impressed, up to a point 
anyway.  If they take documents seriously, readers treat possible arrangements 
of emphases as normative preliminaries, as conceivable contours of answers to 
questions at hand.  Of course, they also bring to the occasion whatever else 
triggers concern -- circumstances, other documents, expectations, any and all 
normative and non-normative pertinent contexts.  These other contributors may 
set conditions of salience, on some occasions conditions so sufficiently pointed or 
otherwise elaborately wrought that explorations of legal documents become 
cursory, quick readings in search of confirmation, echoes of expectations already 
set.  Complex documents become -- are treated as and represented to be -- 
straightforward.  But if the interpretive environment is less well-resolved, either 
before reading documents or afterwards (it now appears), to this extent 
complexity may become a map or model: an occasion for coming to grips not 
only with a legal document itself, but in the process taking hold of -- committing 
to and putting to use -- a now decisive normativity.  The “metaphorics of 
writing” become a “politics of reading.”70  Thinking through complexity may not 
always succeed in this way, of course.  Particular documents in the end may 
sometimes leave a reader as incompletely resolved as other considerations do.  
The distinctive character of legal literacy (or perhaps literarity?71) thus comes 
into view: its intermittence, its sometime appearance as simply surface law, as 
ready-made, standard propositions, documentary packages for conclusions 
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otherwise reached -- and also its sometime irruptive occupation of attention, its 
successful impress of its own array of emphases, distinctively documentarily 
modeled. 
 
 
